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Abstract 
The author addresses the phenomenon of taxable profit-shifting operations undertaken by 
multinationals in response to countries competing for corporate tax bases within the European 
Union. The central question is whether this might be a relic of the past when the European 
Commission’s proposal for a Council Directive on a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax 
Base sees the light of day. Or would the EU-wide corporate tax system provide incentives for 
multinationals to pursue artificial tax base-shifting practices within the EU, potentially 
invigorating the risk of undue governmental tax competition responses? The author’s tentative 
answer on the potential for artificial base shifting and undue tax competition is in the 
affirmative. Today, the issue of harmful tax competition within the EU seems to have been 
pushed back as a result of the soft law approaches that were initiated in the late 1990s and 
early 2000s. But things might change if the CCCTB proposal as currently drafted enters into 
force. There may be a risk that substantial parts of the EU tax base would instantly become 
mobile as of that day. As the EU Member States at that time seem to have only a single tool 
available to respond to this – the tax rate – that may perhaps initiate an undesirable race for 
the EU tax base, at least theoretically. 
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1 Introduction 
On Tuesday, 11 June 2013 the Foundation European Fiscal Studies and Erasmus Law Review 
organised a conference entitled Company Tax Integration in the EU; A Necessary Step to 
Neutralize ‘Excessive’ Behaviour within the EU? – a subject that is very interesting and quite 
topical. The issues of ‘aggressive tax planning’ and ‘harmful tax competition’ have moved 
strikingly up political agendas recently.1 Many believe that multinationals also should 
contribute their ‘fair share’ to society, particularly in the current times of austerity where 
expenditure cuts and tax raises pressurise the welfare state.2 I was assigned the honourable 
task of participating in the conference and elaborating on the following subject: Tax 
Competition within the European Union – Is the CCCTB-Directive a Solution? Conference 
reports have been published in EC Tax Review and the Dutch tax weekly, Weekblad Fiscaal 
Recht.3 
This article is the result of my endeavours. Playing the hand that I have been dealt, I address 
the apparent current issue of taxable profit-shifting operations undertaken by multinationals in 
response to countries competing for corporate tax bases within the European Union (EU). The 
central question is whether this might be a relic of the past when the proposal released by the 
                                                 
1 For some comments see Oliver R. Hoor and G. Bock, ‘The Misleading Debate About Corporate Tax Avoidance by 
Multinationals’, 70 Tax Notes International 907 (27 May 2013). 
2 For an in-depth analysis see Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, ‘Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare 
State’, 113 Harvard Law Review, at 1573 (1999-2000). 
3 See Martijn Schippers, ‘Company Tax Integration in the European Union – a Necessary Step to Neutralise “Excessive” 
Behaviour within the EU’ – Report on the Conference Held on Tuesday 11 June 2013 in Rotterdam’, 22 EC Tax Review 258, 
at 258-263(2013, No. 5); and M.L. Schippers, Company tax integration in the European Union, Verslag van de conferentie 
“Company tax integration in the European Union – a necessary step to neutralise ‘excessive’ behavior within the EU”, 
gehouden op dinsdag 11 juni 2013, te Rotterdam, WFR 2013/1165. 
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European Commission on 16 March 2011 for a Council Directive on a Common Consolidated 
Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) sees the light of day,4 or would the EU-wide corporate tax 
system provide incentives for multinationals to pursue artificial tax base-shifting practices 
within the EU, potentially invigorating the risk of undue governmental tax competition 
responses? Obviously, time will tell, but for now my tentative answer to the question whether 
the potential for artificial base shifting and undue tax competition exists is in the affirmative. 
Today, the issue of harmful tax competition within the EU seems to have been pushed back as 
a result of the soft law approaches that were initiated in the late 1990s and early 2000s. But 
things might change if the CCCTB proposal as currently drafted enters into force. There may 
be a risk that substantial parts of the EU tax base would instantly become mobile as of that 
day. As the EU Member States at that time will have only a single tool available to respond to 
that – the tax rate – this may perhaps initiate an undesirable race for the EU tax base, at least 
theoretically. 
Before proceeding on the subject matter, the following remarks should be submitted. First, it 
is noted that the research question leapfrogs some pivotal issues. The CCCTB currently exists 
only on the drawing board. It is uncertain whether it shall ever enter into force. Its adoption 
requires the unanimous consent of the EU Member States – or the early adopters under the 
enhanced cooperation procedures. The CCCTB proposal, however, faces political resistance 
in various EU Member States.5 Further, it is uncertain what the directive will eventually look 
like were it to be adopted. The draft is currently being debated at the different EU institutional 
                                                 
4 Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB), COM(2011) 121/4, 2011/0058 
(CNS) (‘CCCTB proposal’). Legislative references concern the CCCTB proposal unless expressed otherwise. 
5 Various EU Member State parliaments have issued ‘yellow cards’. 
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levels. The European Parliament has voted for amending the proposal on various points.6 The 
Commission cannot accept some of those.7 The proposal has also been discussed within the 
Council.8 Regardless, for the purpose of the analysis in this article, it is assumed that the 
CCCTB has come to light. Furthermore, unless specifically addressed otherwise, any 
references to the CCCTB regard the original proposal of 16 March 2011. Finally, I scrutinise 
the proposal on its own merits. It is accordingly assumed that the CCCTB is the only 
corporate tax system in place within the EU. By doing that, I basically follow the path set out 
by the European Parliament and the European Economic and Social Committee that the 
CCCTB would apply mandatorily.9 
Second, the language used implies that the article should address the issue of tax competition 
within the framework of the EU. Regarding outbound investments of EU investors in non-EU 
countries and inbound investments of non-EU investors in the EU, the CCCTB would 
basically operate as a traditional corporate tax. The proposal’s key properties, the tax 
                                                 
6 See European Parliament legislative resolution of 19 April 2012 on the proposal for a Council directive on a Common 
Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) (COM(2011)0121 – C7-0092/2011 – 2011/0058(CNS)) (‘EP legislative 
resolution’). 
7 See Commission Communication on the action taken on opinions and resolutions adopted by Parliament at the April 2012 
part-session, (SP(2012)388), 30 May 2012 (‘Communication SP(2012)388’). 
8 See Comments of the Presidency of the Council on the CCCTB proposal (doc. 8387/12 FISC 49) published by the Council 
of the European Union, 16 April 2012, no. 2011/0058(CNS). 
9 This after an introductory period; EP legislative resolution, above n. 6, Amendments 14, 21, 22; changes proposed to recital 
8, Arts. 6a (new) and 6b (new), and Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the proposal for a Council 
directive on a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB), COM(2011) 121 final – 2011/0058 (CNS), ECO/302, 
26 October 2011 (‘Opinion EESC’), at 1.4. Notably, under the Commission Proposal the CCCTB would apply electively. It 
would accordingly constitute the 29th corporate tax system within the EU. Potential tax competition and tax planning effects 
that may result from this are not assessed in this article. 
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consolidation and the intra-EU division of the tax base through a sharing mechanism do not 
operate across the water’s edge, that is, the outer geographical borders of the EU’s territories. 
As a consequence, the tax competition and tax planning issues that currently arise in 
international taxation will likely uphold under the CCCTB regarding third-country 
investment.10 For the purpose of the present inquiry, however, this issue falls outside its scope 
and is therefore not explicitly considered. 
Third, I must frankly concede that I am a tax lawyer. I am neither a trained economist nor a 
behavioural scientist. Neither am I a statistical analyst. This article, therefore, does not 
provide an in-depth empirical impact assessment forecasting economic or behavioural effects 
that the CCCTB’s application may initiate upon its entry into force. For that purpose, I 
respectfully refer to the literature on this matter.11 My aim is to forward some tentative 
comments on the potential arbitrage that in my view may be initiated under the CCCTB 
Directive. To substantiate my argument, I seek to carefully and logically build the analysis. 
Where appropriate or convenient, reference is made to available materials and analyses, for 
instance by analogue on the United States (US) and Canadian formulary systems from which 
the CCCTB sharing mechanism has substantially been lifted. 
                                                 
10 See for a comparison Walter Hellerstein, ‘Tax Planning under the CCCTB’s Formulary Apportionment Provisions: The 
Good, the Bad and the Ugly’, in: Dennis Weber (ed.), CCCTB Selected Issues (2012) 221-252, at 223 and 234 (n. 72) calling 
this the system’s ‘Achilles heel’. 
11 See e.g. Commission Staff Working Document, Impact Assessment, Accompanying document to the Proposal for a Council 
Directive on a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB), SEC(2011) 315 final, 16 March 2011; and Leon 
Bettendorf, Albert van der Horst, Ruud de Mooij, Michael Devereux and Simon Loretz, The economic effects of EU-reforms 
in corporate income tax systems, Study for the European Commission, Directorate General for Taxation and Customs Union, 
Contract No. TAXUD/2007/DE/324, October 2009. 
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2 Tax Competition Within the EU 
2.1 Tax Competition: A Matter of AETRs and MNE Investment Location 
Decisions 
The research question implicitly considers the phenomenon ‘tax competition’ to constitute a 
problem. It implies that tax competition is problematical as it resorts to the CCCTB as a 
potential solution, at least within the context of the EU. This begs an answer to the question as 
to what tax competition is in the first place and, second, the extent to which this should be 
considered to pose an issue. 
Tax competition and its flipside phenomenon ‘tax planning’ revolve around average effective 
tax rates (AETRs)12 imposed by countries on investment returns and the investment location 
decisions of multinational enterprises (MNEs). It appears that internationalisation, the 
emerging global marketplace, the increased mobility of resources and the upcoming of profit 
maximisation–driven MNEs have initiated a process of tax-motivated responses to investment 
location decisions, from the sides of both the MNEs and the countries involved.13 
                                                 
12 AETRs are calculated by dividing the tax payable (numerator) by the pre-tax income (denominator), Willem Vermeend, 
Rick van der Ploeg and Jan Willem Timmer, Taxes and the Economy; a Survey on the Impact of Taxes on Growth, 
Employment, Investment, Consumption and the Environment (2008), at 73. Notably, financing decisions respond to marginal 
effective tax rates. Typical corporate tax systems subject realised nominal returns to equity to tax accordingly favouring debt 
financing over equity financing. Cf. Howell H. Zee, ‘Reforming the Corporate Income Tax: The Case for a Hybrid Cash-
Flow Tax,’ 155 De Economist 4, at 417-448 (2007); and Serena Fatica, Thomas Hemmelgarn, and Gaetan Nicodeme, 
Taxation Papers; The Debt-Equity Tax Bias: Consequences And Solutions, Working paper no. 33, July 2012, European 
Commission Directorate-General Taxation & Customs Union. The CCCTB operates a traditional base definition, tax-
subsidising debt financing over equity financing also. This issue is not discussed further since it falls outside the scope of the 
assessment. 
13 See Ruud de Mooij and Sjef Ederveen, Taxation and Foreign Direct Investment: A Synthesis of Empirical Research, 
International Tax and Public Finance 10, no. 6, November 2003, at 277-301, Michael P. Devereux, ‘Taxation of Outbound 
Direct Investment: Economic Principles and Tax Policy Considerations’, 24 Oxford Review of Economic Policy 4, 698-719, 
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As tax may be considered to constitute a corporate cost, the hypothesis is that MNEs respond 
by allocating their resources geographically to countries adopting comparatively lower 
AETRs on investment proceeds: ‘tax planning’. The intuition is that governments respond to 
this by reducing the AETRs that they impose on investment returns – to attract foreign 
investment and to preserve domestic investment, prerequisites for the stimulation of economic 
growth and job creation. This drives other countries to join the race, pushing them to reduce 
their AETRs also: ‘tax competition’. The result would be an ongoing chain of behavioural 
responses of MNE investment location decisions and country tax rate reduction decisions. The 
latter, as already noted, is an attempt by these countries to attract investment to their territories 
to enable themselves to subject the investment returns to taxation for the purpose of yielding 
revenues to finance expenditure: the ‘race to the bottom hypothesis’. 
2.2 ‘Fair Tax Competition’ and ‘Harmful Tax Competition’ 
2.2.1 Multinationals: Tax-Induced Shifting of Real and ‘Paper’ Investment; Tax 
Law: Only Latter Problematical 
The tax-induced shifts in MNE investment location decisions may involve shifts in both real 
economic activities and artificial economic activities. In international taxation the aim is to 
divide the corporate tax base into taxing jurisdictions with reference to the location of 
investment. In the presence of AETR differentials, such a geographic distribution of taxable 
                                                                                                                                                        
at 710-711 (2008); Michael P. Devereux, Taxes in the EU New Member States and the Location of Capital and Profit, 
Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation, Working Paper, No. 0703, Michael P. Devereux, ‘Business Taxation in a 
Globalized World’, 24 Oxford Review of Economic Policy 4, at 625-638 (2008); Michael P. Devereux, Ben Lockwood and 
Michela Redoano, ‘Do Countries Compete Over Corporate Tax Rates?’, 92 Journal of Public Economics, at 1210-1235 
(2008); and J. Voget, Headquarter Relocations and International Taxation, Oxford University, Centre for Business Taxation, 
Oxford, 2008. 
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profit creates incentives to locate both real and ‘paper’ investment in no-tax or low-tax 
jurisdictions. 
The first type of investment location distortions involves shifting into these low-tax or no-tax 
jurisdictions of the firm inputs like labour and capital that have been attracted from the labour 
and capital markets. This entails a tax-induced shifting of real profit towards these 
jurisdictions, and a consequent shifting of taxable profit. Various studies suggest that AETR 
differentials do affect location decisions.14 That particularly is, as rents prove, increasingly 
firm-specific rather than location-specific. It should be mentioned, though, that the tax 
responsiveness to real activity seems less apparent than the tax responsiveness to locating 
‘paper’ investments. 
                                                 
14 Ibidem, as well as Harry Huizinga and Luc Laeven, International profit shifting within multinationals: a Multi-country 
perspective,  Economic paper No. 264, European Commission, Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs, 
December 2006; Michael P. Devereux and R. Glenn Hubbard, Taxing Multinationals, NBER Working Paper Series, Working 
Paper 7920, National Bureau of Economic Research, September 2000; Alan J. Auerbach, Michael P. Devereux and Helen 
Simpson, Taxing Corporate Income, Paper Prepared for the Mirrlees Review, Reforming the Tax System for the 21st Century 
(2008), at 17-18; Ruud A. de Mooij and Michael P. Devereux, ‘An Applied Analysis of ACE and CBIT Reforms in the EU’, 
18 International Tax and Public Finance 1, at section 3.3 (2011); Ruud de Mooij, ‘Will Corporate Income Taxation 
Survive?’, 153 De Economist, at 277-301 (2005); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, ‘Between Formulary Apportionment and the OECD 
Guidelines A Proposal for Reconciliation’, World Tax Journal 3, at 6 (February 2010); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah and Ilan 
Benshalom, ‘Formulary Apportionment – Myths and Prospects; Promoting Better International Tax Policies by Utilizing the 
Misunderstood and Under-Theorized Formulary Alternative’, World Tax Journal 371, at 393 (October 2011); Reuven S. Avi-
Yonah and Kimberly A. Clausing, Reforming Corporate Taxation in a Global Economy: A Proposal to Adopt Formulary 
Apportionment, The Hamilton Project, Discussion Paper 2007-08, The Brookings Institution, June 2007, at 9-10, Ana 
Agúndez-Garcia, Taxation Papers; The Delineation and Apportionment of an EU Consolidated Tax Base For Multi-
Jurisdictional Corporate Income Taxation: A Review of Issues and Options, Working paper no. 9, October 2006, European 
Commission Directorate-General Taxation & Customs Union, at 7, as well as OECD, Addressing Base Erosion and Profit 
Shifting, OECD Publishing, 12 February 2013 (‘OECD BEPS Report’), and OECD, Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, 
OECD Publishing, 19 July 2013 (‘OECD BEPS Action Plan’). 
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The second type – the tax responsiveness to locating ‘paper’ investment – typically involves a 
legal shifting of intangible resources available within the MNE to low or no-taxing 
jurisdictions. This occurs through ‘tax sheltering’, that is, the intra-group legal shifting 
towards these jurisdictions of the firm’s financial resources or intellectual property. 
Commonly utilised tools in this respect are the setting up and tax-establishing of controlled 
legal entities within such jurisdictions and the subsequent arranging of intra-group legal 
transactions to create tax-recognised income streams directed towards those jurisdictions. This 
is established quite easily because of the mobile characteristics of these intangible resources 
and the absence of third-party market realities in the controlled intra-firm environments 
within which these transactions generally take place. Textbook profit-shifting arrangements 
involve intra-group debt financing and licensing arrangements. These generate tax-deductible 
interest and royalty payments in the countries where real investment takes place. Such tax 
planning tools have been readily made available under the tax systems of countries for MNEs 
to be utilised to arbitrarily shift real profit to low or no-taxing jurisdictions. 
To protect their domestic tax bases, countries typically respond by introducing anti-abuse 
measures – ‘sticks regimes’ – in their corporate tax systems. Examples of these are ‘deduction 
limitations’ and ‘controlled foreign company’ rules.15 Alternatively and additionally, countries 
respond by imposing withholding taxes on outbound intra-group payments of dividends, 
interest and royalties. However, the room available for these measures is often limited as their 
application drives AETRs upwards, potentially rendering these countries relatively less 
attractive as a location for real investment. Further, the leeway for imposing source taxes on 
such outward-bound intra-group payments often encounters legal constraints. This holds 
internationally under the double tax convention networks of countries, which commonly limit 
                                                 
15 Regarding third-country investment relationships, the CCCTB proposal, above n. 4, is no exception as it contains interest 
deduction limitations and CFC rules also (Arts. 80-81 and 82). 
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taxing entitlements at source regarding such payments,16 that is, save for the application of 
various anti-abuse mechanisms such as ‘beneficial ownership requirements’, ‘limitation on 
benefits clauses’ and ‘main purpose tests’. The same holds within the EU as the ‘Parents-
Subsidiary Directive’ and the ‘Interest and Royalty Directive’ operate to a similar extent.17 
Although both the real and artificial shifting of profits may be considered undesirable from an 
economic standpoint, tax law, both international and European, typically considers only the 
latter problematical. It is the tax-induced shifting of corporate profit through intra-group legal 
structuring lacking economic substance that raises the chief concerns. These are the types of 
‘excessive’ behaviours that need to be neutralised. Where MNEs engage in artificial profit-
shifting arrangements to maximise their post-tax investment returns, such behavioural 
responses are generally labelled as ‘aggressive tax planning’.18 
2.2.2 Countries: Tax-Induced Competing for Real and ‘Paper’ Investment; Tax 
Law: Only Latter Problematical 
In tax law, similar views are generally expressed in regard to tax-induced responses of 
governments to MNE artificial profit-shifting operations.19 By differentiating between 
‘harmful tax competition’ and ‘fair tax competition’, issues are considered to be raised 
                                                 
16 See Arts. 10, 11, 12 OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital. 
17 See Council Directive 2011/96/EU of 30 November 2011, and Council Directive 2003/49/EC of 3 June 2003 (amended by 
Council Directive 2004/76/EC of 29 April 2004 and Council Directive 2006/96/EC of 20 November 2006). 
18 It is worth noting that with regard to the Dutch corporate income tax system, the Dutch State Secretary for Finance has 
announced that the Dutch government will take measures in this area. See State Secretary for Finance letter to Parliament, 30 
August 2013, (No. IFZ/2013/320). 
19 See Stefan Mayer, Formulary Apportionment for the Internal Market, IBFD Doctoral Series, Volume 17, IBFD, 
Amsterdam, 2009, at 264-267, and Carla Pinto, Tax Competition and EU Law, EUCOTAX Series on European Taxation, 
Kluwer Law International, Netherlands, 2003, at 10 et seq. 
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predominantly where countries engage in the first by adopting measures – ‘carrots regimes’ – 
that unduly affect MNE location decisions:20 the adoption of measures by countries that 
provide tax incentives to MNEs to artificially shift corporate profits towards their territories. 
The reason, obviously, is that this goes at the expense of the tax bases and tax revenues of the 
origin countries where real investments take place. Such practices are commonly considered 
to produce unjustified market distortions and revenue losses. 
Harmful tax measures basically revolve around the granting of beneficial tax treatment, ‘tax 
shelters’, to cross-border economic operations that require no substantial business presence or 
‘economic substance’ within such countries. Typically, it involves the low or no-taxation of 
proceeds from intra-group distributions of financial resources or intellectual property. These 
are internationally mobile and legally transferred easily. And as noted earlier, the intra-group 
remunerations in this regard are generally deductible for tax calculation purposes in the 
countries where real investment takes place. Such harmful regimes are typically referred to as 
‘offshore regimes’, ‘group financing regimes’, ‘headquarter regimes’ or ‘IP holding regimes’. 
Sometimes these are paired with taxpayer confidentiality mechanisms on the basis of which 
the low-taxing jurisdictions involved do not disclose tax-relevant administrative and financial 
information to other jurisdictions. Further, the availability of such beneficial regimes is often 
restricted to foreign investors. They are ‘ring-fenced’. Local investors are typically ineligible 
to opt for their application. 
                                                 
20 Within the EU the selective granting of beneficial tax treatment to attract real investment raises illegal state aid issues (Art. 
107 TFEU). EU Member States are not allowed to selectively tax-favour certain industries or branches of economic activity 
as these impede a neutral and fair flow of economic activity within the internal market. Examples of regimes potentially 
constituting an illegal fiscal state are the selectively granting of ‘tax holidays’, ‘accelerated allowances’ and the establishment 
of ‘tax-free zones’. On this matter, see e.g. Commission notice 98/C 384/03, OJ C 384 of 10 December 1998, at 3, and 
Report on the implementation of the Commission notice on the application of the state aid rules to measures relating to direct 
business taxation, C(2004) 434 of 9 February 2004. 
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Fair competition, particularly the competition for real investment through ‘tax rate 
competition’, is generally considered beneficial from a tax law perspective. For instance, the 
Commission submits in the Explanatory Memorandum accompanying its CCCTB proposal: 
[f]air competition on tax rates is to be encouraged. Differences in rates allows a certain 
degree of tax competition to be maintained in the internal market and fair tax competition 
based on rates offers more transparency and allows Member States to consider both their 
market competitiveness and budgetary needs in fixing their tax rates.21 Also, the Council 
acknowledged that fair tax competition produces positive effects when it adopted its ‘Code of 
Conduct for business taxation’, which, among others, deals with EU-wide coordinated actions 
to tackle harmful tax competition – see further details hereunder.22 
Regardless of the merits of analytically differentiating between ‘fair’ and ‘unfair’ tax 
competition, I go with the territory and adhere to the views of the Commission and the 
Council. I accordingly consider that concerns are raised where it involves the tax-induced 
artificial profit shifting of MNEs and the incentives created for doing that by taxing 
jurisdictions. That is, also considering the conference topic addressing ‘excessive’ behaviours, 
which for the present inquiry neatly translates into ‘aggressive tax planning’ regarding MNE 
behaviours and ‘harmful tax competition’ as to country responses. 
                                                 
21 See Explanatory Memorandum to the CCCTB proposal, above n. 4, at section 1. 
22 See e.g. Conclusions of the ECOFIN Council Meeting on 1 December 1997 concerning taxation policy (OJ 98/C 2/01). The Code 
defines harmful tax measures as measures (including administrative practices) which affect or may affect in a significant way 
the location of business activity in the Community, and which provide for a significantly lower level of taxation than those 
that generally apply in the Member State concerned. 
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2.3 Work Done in EU Addressing ‘Harmful Tax Competition’ 
Both internationally, for instance within the context of the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD),23 and within the EU much work has already been done 
in pushing back harmful tax practices. In the late 1990s, the Council of Economics and 
Finance Ministers adopted the Code of Conduct for business taxation. With that it initiated a 
‘soft law’ process ‘peer-pressuring’ the EU Member States to roll back existing harmful tax 
measures, and to dissuade them from introducing any such measures in the future. This 
process is being monitored by the Code of Conduct Group. 
Although the Code is not legally binding, it does have political force since all EU Member 
States committed to adhere to the approach taken. The Code may be considered to have 
served its purpose quite well. Since the adoption of the Code, the Code of Conduct Group has 
assessed over 400 tax regimes within the EU and the EU Member States’ overseas countries 
and territories. Around 100 have been eliminated upon their identification as constituting a 
harmful tax measure.24 In addition, various administrative assistance tools are currently in 
                                                 
23 Reference is made to the work of the OECD’s ‘Forum on Harmful Tax Practices’. The Forum was created as a follow-up to 
a 1998 report entitled Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging Global Issue. It focuses on transparency and information 
exchange. For some recent work, see OECD Secretary-General report to the G20 Finance Ministers, 19 April 2013, at Part 
II: Current tax work of relevance to tackle offshore tax evasion and tax avoidance. 
24 The numbers have been taken from Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the 
European Economic and Social Committee, Promoting Good Governance in Tax Matters, COM(2009) 201 final, 28 April 
2009. Also, ‘Questions and Answers’ (MEMO/12/949) that accompanied the Commission’s ‘December Package’ , i.e., its 
communication to the European Parliament and the Council entitled ‘An Action Plan to strengthen the fight against tax fraud 
and tax evasion’, (COM(2012) 722 final) (‘EC Action Plan’), its recommendation on aggressive tax planning (c(2012) 8806 
final) (‘ATP Recommendation’), and its recommendation regarding measures intended to encourage third countries to apply 
minimum standards of good governance in tax matters (c(2012) 8805 final), which the Commission released on 6 December 
2012 (‘3rd Countries Recommendation’). Further, Commission’s press release entitled ‘Clamping down on tax evasion and 
avoidance: Commission presents the way forward’ (IP/12/1325). The package followed up on the communication from the 
Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on concrete ways to reinforce the fight against tax fraud and tax 
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place within the EU, enabling EU Member States to inform and assist each other on their 
taxpayers’ tax affairs.25 The presence of harmful corporate tax measures within the EU seems 
to have been significantly pushed back as a result of these efforts. To substantiate things 
somewhat further, it is noted that this argument may also be induced by pointing at the shift in 
recent work undertaken in this area. The work on harmful tax practices within the EU’s 
institutions has recently been concentrating on establishing approaches to counter such 
practices of third countries.26 
Further, efforts undertaken more recently at political levels – again both within the EU27 and 
internationally (OECD/G20)28 – increasingly focus on pushing back tax planning strategies 
undertaken by MNEs through the sophisticated utilisation to their benefit of mutual 
differentials in the tax systems of countries. MNEs are being accused of employing the 
disparities or ‘mismatches’ in the corporate tax systems of countries to reduce their overall 
effective tax burdens without substantially altering their investments. It has been argued that 
                                                                                                                                                        
evasion including in relation to third countries (COM(2012) 351 final) of 27 June 2012. In addition, it is worth noting that the 
European Commission views the patent box regime in place in the United Kingdom’s international tax system as harmful tax 
competition. See European Commission, Code of Conduct Group (Business Taxation), UK – Patent Box, Room Document # 
2 of 22 October 2013. It considers that ‘the advantages under the regime are granted even without any real activity and 
substantial economic presence in the Member State involved’. It further considers that ‘the rules for profit determination do 
not adhere to internationally accepted principles.’ 
25 See e.g. Council Directive 2011/16/EU of 15 February 2011 and Council Directive 2010/24/EU of 16 March 2010. 
26 See e.g. 3rd Countries Recommendation, above n. 20. 
27 See e.g. ATP Recommendation, above n. 20. See also European Commission, Staff working paper, The internal market: 
factual examples of double non-taxation cases, Consultation document, Brussels, TAXUD D1 D(2012) (‘Consultation 
Document’). 
28 See OECD BEPS Report, above n. 14; OECD BEPS Action Plan, above n. 14; OECD, Hybrid mismatch arrangements; 
Tax policy and compliance issues, OECD, Paris, 2012. 
– DRAFT – DO NOT CITE – DO NOT QUOTE – 
 
this, for instance, occurs by making use of so-called ‘Hybrid Instruments’, ‘Hybrid Entities’, 
‘Hybrid Transfers’, ‘Dual Residence Entities’, ‘(Double) Deduction/No Inclusion 
Transactions’ and ‘Foreign Tax Credit Transactions’.29 The common denominator of these 
arrangements is the use of differentials in countries’ taxable unit definitions, tax base 
definitions and tax base allocation mechanisms. 
However, as these recently and quite heavily discussed tax practices of MNEs revolve around 
utilising the mismatches between two or more taxing systems, it may be considered debatable 
whether the disparities in the tax systems of countries, the EU Member States’ included, 
should be labelled as constituting harmful tax measures. Perhaps I am a traditionalist, but in 
my view, harmful tax measures involve the utilisation by MNEs of targeted favourable tax 
benefits made available through the tax system of a single tax jurisdiction. This is not the case 
with mismatch arrangements as these involve the use of differentials between at least two tax 
systems, although the Code of Conduct Group has been discussing mismatch issues lately.30 
3 CCCTB – The Solution? 
3.1 Would the CCCTB Provide Incentives for Artificial Profit Shifting, Potentially 
Reinvigorating Undue Tax Competition Within the EU? 
The peer pressures in the 1990s and early 2000s seem to have produced considerable success 
in pushing back harmful tax measures in the EU Member States’ corporate tax systems. 
Within the EU the issue of harmful tax competition may be considered to have been 
mitigated. 
                                                 
29 Ibidem, and see Consultation Document, above n. 27. 
30 See EC Action Plan, above n. 24. 
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Perhaps, therefore, the research question addressed in the introduction requires some 
modification; namely, today, the issue of harmful tax competition seems to have been 
successfully resolved, at least within the EU. Hence, let me rephrase the assigned query and 
consider whether the CCCTB, if enacted, would provide incentives for MNEs to artificially 
shift corporate profits across the EU. If the answer to this question is in the affirmative, this 
may trigger the potential for an undue, or perhaps at least unforeseen, race between the EU 
Member States for attracting and preserving MNE corporate tax bases within their territories. 
As part of the analysis, as said, I assess the CCCTB on its individual merits. Although 
understanding political realities perhaps pointing in alternative directions, I assume that the 
CCCTB is operational EU-wide and applies mandatorily – to analytically cancel out the 
potential effects of a CCCTB competing with the corporate tax systems of the 28 EU Member 
States.31 I will accordingly follow the European Parliament’s tracks in this respect.32 Further, 
as the CCCTB is currently under debate and its final version is consequently indistinct, I refer 
to the initial proposal of the European Commission. Where relevant or convenient, reference 
is made to the amendments submitted by the various parties involved in the legislative 
process. 
3.2 CCCTB: ‘A Comprehensive Solution’ 
The Commission envisages the CCCTB as constituting a comprehensive solution for the 
inequities and inefficiencies that are currently present under the application of 28 different 
                                                 
31 Kindly note that Croatia has joined the EU per 1 July 2013. 
32 European Parliament proposed to amend the initial CCCTB proposal for various reasons, among them to arrive at a 
mandatory application of the CCCTB for all (but small and medium-sized enterprises) after a brief transition period; EP 
legislative resolution, above n. 6, Amendments 14, 21, 22; changes proposed to recital 8, Arts. 6a (new) and 6b (new). The 
Commission cannot accept this; Communication SP(2012)388, above n. 7. 
– DRAFT – DO NOT CITE – DO NOT QUOTE – 
 
corporate tax systems in the EU.33 The tax systems of the EU Member States currently hinder, 
both in their unilateral and mutual operation, the envisaged fair and free cross-border intra-EU 
trade and investment operations of European economic operators within the internal market. 
The Commission considers that, from a direct taxation perspective, the full potential of the 
internal market may be realised only under an EU-wide corporate tax system for EU 
businesses, the CCCTB. Its key properties are, first, a common taxable unit definition. That is, 
substantially as all companies that have a tax nexus within the EU which belong to the same 
group, the ‘group members’, are required to consolidate their profits and to eliminate their 
intra-group transactions.34 Across the water’s edge, as already noted, the CCCTB operates as a 
traditional corporate tax adopting the concepts of ‘separate accounting’ and the ‘arm’s length 
standard’ (SA/ALS). Second, the CCCTB provides for a common tax base definition. It has 
been chosen to adopt a traditional realisation-based nominal return to equity standard, that is, 
a corporate tax base definition as commonly adopted in the current tax systems of the EU 
Member States.35 Third, the tax base is subsequently shared among the EU Member States on 
                                                 
33 Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee, 
Towards an Internal Market without tax obstacles; A strategy for providing companies with a consolidated corporate tax 
base for their EU-wide activities, COM(2001) 582 final, 23 October 2001. Here the Commission established its policy for 
developing the CCCTB. It confirmed it in its Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament 
and the European Economic and Social Committee, An Internal Market without company tax obstacles achievements, 
ongoing initiatives and remaining challenges, COM(2003)726 final, 24 November 2003. 
34 Administratively, the CCCTB proposal, above n. 4, adopts the ‘one-stop-shop’ approach for tax return filing purposes. The 
return may be filed with the tax authorities of a single EU Member State. This would be the country in which the parent 
company of the group, the ‘principal taxpayer’, resides for tax purposes. 
35 As the CCCTB proposal, above n. 4, subjects the nominal return to equity to tax, it tax-favours debt financing over equity 
financing. Further, under the adoption of SA/ALS also, intra-firm debt financing is recognised for tax base definition and tax 
base allocation purposes. As these arrangements do not add value to the firm, their tax recognition provides an incentive for 
MNE firms to engage in ‘CCCTB-base erosion and profit shifting’ through intra-group debt financing arrangements across 
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the basis of a predetermined formula. The formula factors seek to apportion the tax base by 
reference to firm inputs (assets, labour) at origin and firm outputs (revenues) at destination. 
The sharing mechanism has essentially been lifted from the formulary mechanisms to divide 
taxable corporate profits to subnational levels of government that are currently in place in the 
US and Canada. Conforming to the language used in these countries, the approach taken may 
be referred to as ‘formulary apportionment’ (US) or ‘formulary allocation’ (Canada), 
commonly abbreviated as FA. 
Through the adoption of a single set of rules on corporate taxation throughout the EU, tax 
competition within the EU’s territories under the CCCTB is pictured to revolve solely around 
transparent tax rate competition. That is, since the only tool available for EU Member States 
to influence intra-EU MNE location decisions would be the tax rate that the EU Member 
States may autonomously apply to the harmonised consolidated tax base that has been 
assigned to their territories under the common sharing mechanism. 
Notably, the European Parliament has voted in favour of introducing the possibility for 
EU Member States to make use of tax credits to reduce the post-shared tax base, that is, to 
enable them to adopt certain incentives for businesses.36 Research on equivalents in the 
Canadian formulary allocation system suggests that such a tool would likely initiate tax 
competition between EU Member States for intra-EU investment.37 The Commission has 
                                                                                                                                                        
the water’s edge. The CCCTB follows traditional responses by introducing interest deduction limitations to protect their 
domestic tax bases. 
36 See EP legislative resolution, above n. 6, Amendment 9; changes proposed to recital 5. 
37 See Joan Martens Weiner, Taxation Papers; Formulary Apportionment and Group Taxation in the European Union: 
Insights from the United States and Canada, Working paper no 8, March 2005, European Commission Directorate-General 
Taxation & Customs Union, at Chapter 6. 
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submitted that it cannot accept this amendment for technical reasons.38 In my view, the 
utilisation of tax credits for businesses may entail the risk of triggering fiscal state aid issues 
and should therefore be considered a route not to be followed.39 
3.3 CCCTB: Incentives for Artificial Tax Base Shifting? 
3.3.1 Various Issues Would be Resolved Under the CCCTB 
Such a more or less unitary approach where the group’s profits are shared geographically by 
means of a formulary mechanism (‘unitary taxation’) reflecting inputs and outputs is 
generally considered to produce less opportunity for engaging in artificial tax avoidance 
operations.40 
That is, first, in comparison with the SA/ALS system as currently in place both internationally 
and within the EU. The cancelling out of the recognition of intra-group legal reality within the 
EU would entail a significant step towards mitigating many of the current issues in 
international taxation, as it takes away the key tools currently employed by countries and 
MNEs for engaging in artificial profit shifting.41 The relocating of the firm’s intangible 
resources through controlled legal transactions would be rendered impossible. It may be noted 
that aggressive tax planning operations typically do not occur outside the controlled 
                                                 
38 See Communication SP(2012)388, above n. 7. 
39 See also Weiner, above n. 37, at 51-52 (footnote 75). 
40 See e.g., Hellerstein, above n. 10, at 222. 
41 Cf. Maarten F. de Wilde, A Step towards a Fair Corporate Taxation of Groups in the Emerging Global Market, 39 Intertax 
62, at 62-84 (2011). 
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environment within the functionally integrated MNE firm.42 With respect to third-party 
transactions, it may be argued that a sufficient ‘self-policing mechanism’ exists in the form of 
the opposing underlying economic interests that drive third-party market transactions in a 
competitive business environment.43 
Secondly, a coordinated approach would put an end to the unfair ‘overtaxation’ and 
‘undertaxation’ of proceeds from intra-EU cross-border investment relative to domestic 
investment proceeds. It would also halt the tax-induced distortions that result from 
differentials in taxable unit definitions, tax base definitions and tax allocation mechanisms. 
Indeed, the disparities and mismatches hammering the uncoordinated international tax regime 
would be effectively brought to an end under a coordinated EU-wide corporate taxation 
approach. The sole tax differential remaining within the EU would be a rate differential. 
Thirdly, a known property of formulary regimes to geographically divide MNE profit is that 
they provide an incentive to locate apportionment factors in low-taxing jurisdictions.44 Indeed, 
                                                 
42 See for a comparison Mayer, above n. 19, at 177: “Profit shifting between two entities mainly takes place when they are 
under common control, whereas below that level external shareholders can be expected to oppose measures that artificially 
reduce one company’s profits or increase its tax burden.” See also Benjamin F. Miller, ‘None Are So Blind as Those Who 
Will Not See’, 66 Tax Notes 1023, at 1030 (February 13, 1995): “For entities that are 50-percent-or-less owned, a self-
policing mechanism exists in the form of the other shareholders.” 
43 Perhaps some arbitrage may arise to the extent that the CCCTB group definition would prove not to align with the firm as a 
single economic unit. This is not discussed further as I tentatively consider this possibility to be of some lesser concern than 
the potential for arbitrage under the sharing mechanism discussed hereunder. For some analysis on the CCCTB Group 
definition, see Workshop on the Common Consolidated Corporation Tax (CCCTB), Room Document 1: Eligibility Tests for 
Companies and Definition of a CCCTB Group, TaxudD1/ CCCTB/RD\001\doc\en, 30 August 2010. On group definitions 
generally see De Wilde, above n. 41, at 62-84. 
44 See Hellerstein, above n. 10, at 233. See also Opinion EESC, above n. 9, at 1.2.6, as well as Albert van der Horst, Leon 
Bettendorf, and Hugo Rojas-Romagosa, Will corporate tax consolidation improve efficiency in the EU?, Tinbergen Institute 
Discussion Paper, TI 2007-076/2, September 2007. 
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the theoretical literature and empirical research available on formulary systems suggest that in 
the presence of AETR differentials, MNEs engage in profit shifting through factor shifting 
where tax jurisdictions respond by tax-competing with each other to attract and preserve 
investment.45 Also, formulary systems bring tax competition. 
These profit-shifting incentives would disappear under an EU-wide harmonised tax rate – the 
potential path suggested by the European Parliament46 – or the adoption of a revenue-sharing 
mechanism.47 Derivatively, location distortions would be mitigated to the extent that rate 
bandwidths or minimum rates would be introduced. 
The Commission, however, has expressed that it cannot accept rate coordination.48 It 
considers that the CCCTB proposal is meant not to touch upon tax rates. It sets forth that [t]he 
determination of tax rates is treated as a matter inherent in Member States’ tax sovereignty 
                                                 
45 See Charles E. McLure, Jr., ‘The State Corporate Income Tax: Lambs in Wolves’ Clothing’, in: Henry J. Aaron and 
Michael J. Boskin (eds.), The Economics of Taxation (1980), at 327-346; R. Gordon and J.D. Wilson, ‘An Examination of 
Multijurisdictional Corporate Income Taxation under Formula Apportionment’, 54 Econometrica 6, at 1357-1373 (1986); 
Austan Goolsbee, and Edward Maydew, ‘Coveting Thy Neighbor’s Manufacturing: The Dilemma of State Income 
Apportionment’, 75 Journal of Public Economics, at 125-143 (2000); Kelly Edmiston, ‘Strategic Apportionment of the State 
Corporate Income Tax’, 55 National Tax Journal 2, at 239-262 (2002). For comprehensive overviews, reference is made to 
Garcia, above n. 14; and Weiner, above n. 37. 
46 European Parliament proposed to introduce the possibility for future rate harmonisation; EP legislative resolution, above n. 
6, Amendment 10; changes proposed to recital 5a (new). If the CCCTB would apply mandatorily as well, that would 
effectively introduce a fully centralised ‘EU Company Income Tax’ (EUCIT). 
47 See for a comparison Thomas Horst, ‘A Note on The Optimal Taxation of International Investment Income’, 98 Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 4, at 793-798 (June 1980); Devereux, above n. 13, at 706; and Malcolm Gammie, ‘Corporate Taxation 
in Europe – Paths to a Solution’, British Tax Review, at 233-249 (2001). 
48 See Communication SP(2012)388, above n. 7. 
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and is therefore left to be dealt with through national legislation.49 Rate harmonisation would 
also likely face political resistance in the EU Member States as this would involve a 
substantial transfer of fiscal autonomy from the states to the union. 
3.3.2 In Search of Arbitrage Potentials Under the Sharing Mechanism 
3.3.2.1 Subject of Analysis: Only Potentials for Artificial Tax Base Shifting 
Under the ‘fair’ versus ‘harmful’ tax competition paradigm, tax-induced factor shifting may 
not be considered problematical if and insofar as the location distortions would involve the 
shifting of real inputs and outputs.50 However, the converse may be considered to hold to the 
extent that the CCCTB would enable MNE firms to engage in artificial factor-shifting 
operations, being encouraged to do so by EU Member States setting the comparatively lowest 
of EU AETRs. 
Accordingly, only the potential for artificial tax base shifting within the EU through factor 
manipulation may be considered problematical. It is noted that to the extent that the CCCTB 
would promote artificial factor shifting, this may be considered quite a problem indeed. This 
may particularly be considered to hold since the CCCTB seems to lack sufficient tools to 
counter such practices, were these to come to pass. The CCCTB’s anti-abuse provisions, for 
instance, like the ‘General Anti-Abuse Rule’ – targeting artificial legal arrangements set up to 
avoid tax – seem to merely refer to excessive behaviours concerning the tax base calculation.51 
                                                 
49 See Explanatory memorandum to the CCCTB Proposal, above n. 4, at section 3. 
50 This effect may be considered to occur if and to the extent that the CCCTB’s sharing mechanism would actually attribute 
the tax base geographically to the locations of real inputs and real outputs (though in my view it does not, as discussed 
hereunder) – i.e., in the presence of AETR differentials. See for a comparison Horst et al., above n. 44, at 2-3. 
51 See Arts. 80-83.  
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The abuse of apportionment rules seems to fall outside the confines of the CCCTB’s anti-
abuse rules.52 Furthermore, the ‘Safeguard Clause’ in the proposal, which is directed at 
correcting unfair outcomes under the general formula, seems to apply only when all the EU 
Member States’ authorities involved agree.53 Accordingly, the safeguard clause seems to 
require unanimous consent. Moreover, some uncertainties exist as to whether the rulemaking 
authority of the Commission regarding the sharing mechanism would enable it to adopt 
substantial changes to the legislative act.54 I am not a cynic, but it may be fair to say that it 
remains to be seen how much room will effectively be available at the end of the day to 
resolve the issues that might emerge concerning MNE factor manipulation activities and EU 
Member State tax competition responses. 
3.3.2.2 Formulary Apportionment: Dividing Profit Fairly by Reference to 
Inputs at Origin and Outputs at Destination 
Generally, formulary mechanisms seek to divide corporate profit among tax jurisdictions by 
using a predetermined fixed formula.55 Like any corporate tax base division mechanism, 
formulary systems seek to establish a taxable presence concept to geographically locate the 
firm’s economic presence within a jurisdiction (‘nexus’). Furthermore, formulary systems 
seek to establish a methodology to subsequently evaluate the income that the respective firm 
                                                 
52 Cf. Comment by Dennis Weber on the CCCTB Proposal, Vakstudie H&I, Highlights and Insights on European taxation, 
2011/6.1, at 57. Perhaps some room upholds under the EU’s ‘abuse of law doctrine’. Matters seem indistinct here, though. 
For some analysis see Peter Harris, ‘The CCCTB GAAR: A Toothless Tiger or Russian Roulette?’, in: Weber (ed.), above n. 
9, at 271-297. 
53 See Art. 87. 
54 See Art. 97. Cf. Hellerstein, above n. 10, at 232, and Chapter 5. 
55 See for a comparison Michael J. McIntyre, ‘The Use of Combined Reporting by Nation-States’, in: Brian J Arnold, Jacques 
Sasseville and Eric M Zolt (eds.), The Taxation of Business Profits under Tax Treaties (2003), at 245-298. 
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derives at that particular geographic location (‘allocation’), that is, to geographically allocate 
the taxable profit to that jurisdiction. 
For this purpose, formulary systems typically apportion corporate earnings with reference to 
firm inputs and firm outputs, respectively, reflecting the supply and demand sides of income 
production.56 Essentially, they seek to approximate the inputs geographically with reference to 
the remunerations that the firm pays in return for utilising its workers and assets in the 
business process (‘allocation’). Conceptually, the aim is to localise these workers and assets at 
origin, that is, where they exercise their employment contracts and where the assets are 
functionally utilised in the business process (‘nexus’). Outputs are in essence sought to be 
approximated with reference to the remunerations, that is, the gross receipts that the firm 
receives in return for the goods and services it provides (‘allocation’). Conceptually, the aim 
is to localise the firm’s customers at destination, that is, where these customers utilise or 
consume the goods and services that were provided to them (‘nexus’). As regards the 
assigning of outputs at destination, the analytical comparability with the value-added taxation 
system in the EU (‘EU-VAT’) is apparent. 
Formulary apportionment accordingly recognises income production as the outcome of the 
interplay of both supply and demand.57 It attributes income to both the country of investment 
                                                 
56 It would be consistent to apportion both profits as losses. The CCCTB, however, only apportions profits under the sharing 
mechanism (Art. 86(2)). Losses are carried forward on a non-shared basis. This creates complexities where mergers and 
acquisitions are involved in the presence of ring-fenced loss carry forwards. These need to be geographically divided to make 
sure that CCCTB losses do not cross EU Member State tax borders, see Chapters X and XI CCCTB Proposal, above n. 4. 
This is not discussed further. See on this matter Jan van de Streek, ‘The CCCTB Concept of Consolidation and the Rules on 
Entering a Group’, 40 Intertax I, at 24-32 (2012); and Jan van de Streek, ‘The CCCTB Rules on Leaving a Group’, 40 
Intertax 6/7, at 421-430 (2012). 
57 Cf. Peggy B. Musgrave, ‘Principles for Dividing the State Corporate Tax Base’, in: Charles E. McLure, Jr. (ed.), The State 
Corporation Income Tax: Issues in Worldwide Unitary Combination (1984), at 228-246. 
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(‘origin state’) and the country where the goods and services are marketed (‘destination 
state’). Further, formulary systems modestly seek to provide a fair geographical division of 
income rather than identifying the ‘true’ geographic source of income – recognising that 
corporate income essentially lacks geographical attributes.58 The weighting of factors, 
accordingly, is considered a matter of judgment.59 
Notably, profit division on the basis of formulary mechanisms conceptually differs from the 
profit division approaches in international taxation. Internationally, the corporate tax base is 
sought to allocate income merely with reference to the tax jurisdictions of origin (i.e., the 
location of firm inputs). The international tax regime makes use of the concepts of nationality, 
residence and situs to establish corporate taxable presence within a taxing jurisdiction 
(‘nexus’). The concept of SA/ALS has been used almost universally to subsequently evaluate 
the firm’s geographical presence at origin (‘allocation’). The above-mentioned carrots and 
sticks regimes apply regarding the artificialities and ensuing distortions that the nexus and 
allocation processes produce. The countries where the firm’s goods and services are marketed 
– the destination states – are typically neglected in international taxation. 
Also, the CCCTB sharing mechanism divides corporate profits within the EU through a 
‘nexus’ and ‘allocation’ process. The CCCTB formula echoes the traditional equally weighted 
                                                 
58 Cf. e.g., McIntyre, above n. 55, at 253, Walter Hellerstein, ‘International Income Allocation in the 21st Century: The Case 
for Formulary Apportionment’, 12 International Transfer Pricing Journal 103 103-111, at 104 (2005); and Peggy B. 
Musgrave, ‘Interjurisdictional Equity in Company Taxation: Principles and Applications to the European Union’, in: Sijbren 
Cnossen (ed.) Taxing Capital Income in the European Union, Issues and Options for Reform (2000), at 46-77. 
59 Cf. Garcia, above n. 14, at 33. See for a comparison Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base, Working Group, Working 
Paper No. 60, CCCTB: possible elements of the sharing mechanism, TAXUD TF1/GR/FF, CCCTB/WP060\doc\en, 13 
November 2007 (‘WP 060’), at 6: “The Commission Services consider that the weighting of the factors is not a technical 
issue and recommend that any discussion on the weighting be carried out at political level…” 
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three-factor ‘Massachusetts formula’ developed in US state income taxation in the 1950s.60 In 
the original CCCTB proposal, the formula takes the following form:61 
 
3.3.2.3 Conceptual Peculiarities in the Sharing Mechanism 
Regardless of the merits of composing the formula accordingly,62 some peculiar elements may 
be recognised in the sharing mechanism. Before I proceed, kindly note that I will not engage 
                                                 
60 See for some reading and analysis Walter Hellerstein and  Charles E. McLure, Jr., ‘The European Commission’s Report on 
Company Income Taxation: What the EU Can Learn from the Experience of the US States’, 11 International Tax and Public 
Finance, at 199-220 (2004), Garcia, above n. 14; and Weiner, above n. 37. 
61 See Art. 86(1). 
62 European Parliament proposed to increase the weight on inputs (labour: 45%, assets: 45%) and reduce the weight on 
outputs (sales: 10%); see EP legislative resolution, above n. 6, Amendments 16 and 31; changes proposed to recital 21 and 
86. Parliament argues that this would be more in line with the attribution in international taxation of taxing entitlements to the 
country of source. Notably, the Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection proposed to take out the sales 
factor altogether for similar reasons and for the factor being perceived to be manipulable: “An independent sales agent 
(located in a non-CCCTB State) could be contracted as an intermediary to do the sales on behalf of the group to the relevant 
market, and thereby move the destination of the sales from the ‘intended’ state to the state of choice,” Opinion of the 
Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection for the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs on the 
proposal for a Council directive on a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB), (COM(2011)0121 – C7-
0092/2011 – 2011/0058(CNS)), 25 January 2012. I am not sure whether such manipulation would significantly arise. Further, 
I doubt whether this behaviour should qualify as aggressive tax planning – to the extent that it would arise. That is, since such 
a scenario would involve third-party market transactions, real economic activity accordingly, underlying the sharing of the 
tax saving. In addition, the intermediary third party would charge a fee for its services as it would bear the economic risk 
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in a comprehensive analysis of the formula factors or their weighting – US practices for 
instance reveal a tendency towards favouring the putting of higher weights on the sales factor; 
today, many states even adopt sales-only formulae.63 Furthermore, I will not go into the details 
regarding the definitions used or the factors’ scopes of application. I will also not pursue an 
in-depth analysis in regard to their evaluation and geographic localisation.64 My aim is merely 
to submit some remarks on the properties that I regard as potentially producing undue or at 
least unforeseen arbitrage. 
3.3.2.4 Using International Taxation Concepts to Establish Nexus 
As already seen, some conceptual peculiarities may be recognised in the CCCTB sharing 
mechanism. 
First, it is noted that the CCCTB proposal uses the same nexus concepts that are currently in 
place in international taxation to establish tax jurisdiction. As regards the establishing of the 
firm’s taxable presence within an EU Member State, the proposal does not refer to the 
presence of workforce, assets or turnover in that country. That, for instance, would be the case 
                                                                                                                                                        
involving the performance of its full-fledged distribution function. In other words, without the passage of economic risk, 
there may be be no third-party sale. Further, such a tax planning operation would likely trigger additional transportation 
costs. Cf. Hellerstein, above n. 10, at 237. Regardless, the Commission cannot accept the amendment; Communication 
SP(2012)388, above n. 7, considering an equally weighted three-factor formula the most appropriate solution. 
63 See Multistate Tax Commission, Multistate Tax Compact Article IV – Recommended Amendments, 3 May 2012, at 10-14 
(‘MTC 2012a’), and Multistate Tax Commission, Multistate Tax Compact Article IV Recommended Amendments As 
approved for Public Hearing – December 6, 2012 (‘MTC 2012b’). For an overview of the formulae adopted by the US states 
as of January 1, 2013, see David Spencer, ‘Unitary taxation with combined reporting: The TP solution?’, 25 International 
Tax Review, at 2-5 (April 2013). 
64 See for some analysis Antonio Russo, Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base: The Sharing Mechanism, Some General 
Considerations, in: Weber (ed.), above n. 9, at 207-219, and the literature references in that publication. 
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under the alternative application of ‘factor presence tests’.65 It should be noted that the use of 
such an approach would be conceptually more sound, as these tests appreciate the ratio 
underlying formulary apportionment to a greater extent. Factor presence tests directly refer to 
the geographical location firm inputs and firm outputs for taxable profit division purposes – 
see further details hereunder. 
The CCCTB proposal makes use of international tax nexus concepts and attributes the tax 
base to group members, that is, the companies that are part of the CCCTB group.66 The 
geographical presence of these group members is recognised with reference to their tax place 
of residence within an EU Member State or their presence in an EU Member State through a 
‘permanent establishment’. Corresponding with common international tax practices, the 
localisation of a ‘group member’ with reference to its tax residence is determined on the basis 
of the respective company’s ‘place of incorporation’ or its ‘place of effective management’; 
the same holds for the permanent establishment concept. Following international tax law 
approaches, the localisation of a ‘group member’ under the CCCTB proposal occurs by 
assessing whether a business venture is being conducted by a non-resident group company 
through a ‘fixed place of business’ – like a store or branch – situated within the territories of 
an EU Member State. 
                                                 
65 Under a ‘factor presence test’, tax nexus within a taxing jurisdiction would arise where any of the factors (property, payroll, 
sales) or a combination thereof is present within that jurisdiction, subject to a de minimis threshold (wages paid, assets values, 
turnover). See e.g. Mayer, above n. 19, at 202-205, Walter Hellerstein, ‘State Taxation of Electronic Commerce,’ 52 Tax Law 
Review 425 at  (1996-1997), and Charles E. McLure, ‘Implementing State Corporate Income Taxes in the Digital Age,’ 53 
National Tax Journal 4, at (2000). See also WP 060, above n. 59, at 15; and Multistate Tax Commission, Federalism at Risk, 
A Report of the Multistate Tax Commission, June 2003, at Appendix D. For some comparison, see Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, 
‘International Taxation of Electronic Commerce’, 52 Tax Law Review 507, at (1996-1997); and Dale Pinto, ‘The Need to 
Reconceptualize the Permanent Establishment Threshold’, 60 Bulletin for International Taxation 7, at 266-279 (2006). 
66 See Art. 86(1), Arts. 4-6 and 54-55 in conjunction with Chapter XVI. Cf. Hellerstein, above n. 10, at 225. 
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3.3.2.5 Using Factor Allocation Approaches Inconsistent With Inputs at 
Origin and Outputs at Destination 
Second, the CCCTB proposal does not consistently allocate the formula factors 
geographically to the inputs at origin and outputs at destination. A discrepancy seems to have 
been created between the taxable profit division under the formula factors in the sharing 
mechanism and the geographic location of real firm inputs and firm outputs. This holds, for 
instance, for the labour factor and the sales factor. 
The labour factor does not seem to allocate the tax base to the jurisdiction of origin where the 
firm’s workers physically exercise their employment contracts. Instead, employees and 
payroll are allocated to the group member(s) from which the employees receive their 
remunerations. To the extent that employees substantially exercise their employment contracts 
under the control and responsibility of group member(s) other than the group member(s) 
paying the salaries and wages, the factor is allocated to the first mentioned group member(s).67 
The sales factor does not seem to consistently allocate tax base to the jurisdiction of 
destination where the firm’s customers functionally utilise or consume the goods and services 
provided to them.68 For example, the sales factor allocates exempt revenues such as exempt 
                                                 
67 See Arts. 90-91. Notably, fixed assets are allocated to the EU Member State of the group member(s) effectively owning 
them, see Arts. 92-94 in conjunction with 4(20). If the economic owner does not substantially utilise these assets in its 
business process, they are attributed to the group member(s) that effectively does. Intangible assets are not expressly 
allocated under the CCCTB proposal, above n. 4. As a consequence, these piggyback on the profit division in proportion to 
the factors expressly dealt with. 
68 Services e.g. are allocated to the group member located in the EU Member State where the services are physically carried 
out, Art. 96(2). Such a ‘place of performance rule’ reflects the origin side rather than the supply side. The recognition of the 
supply side in this respect – the destination of income – would allocate the factor to the location of the customer or the EU 
Member State where the services are marketed. In EU-VAT, e.g., services are often tax-located in the country where the 
customer is located. This is not discussed further as the location of services physically performed, albeit being the country of 
origin seems hard to manipulate. 
– DRAFT – DO NOT CITE – DO NOT QUOTE – 
 
gross proceeds from (third-country) shareholdings (e.g., dividends, capital gains),69 revenues 
from – loosely phrased – portfolio investments and hedging transactions to the beneficiary. 
That is, to the extent that these revenues have been earned in the ordinary course of trade or 
business.70 
As I am not entirely sure how to interpret the ‘beneficiary’ receiving such revenues ‘in the 
ordinary course of trade or business’ under the sales factor, I tentatively follow the 
suggestions that Hellerstein has submitted in this regard and the analogous guidance provided 
by the Court of Justice in the area of EU-VAT on portfolio investment activities.71 Using 
transfer pricing terminology, I take it to mean that these types of gross receipts are attributed 
to the group member that beneficially owns these72 and functionally performs the MNE’s 
(third-country) shareholding management functions, treasury functions, cash-pooling 
functions and/or functionally manages the MNE’s hedging positions. These types of functions 
performed may be considered to constitute the key components of the firm’s ordinary trade or 
business operations.73 Should this hold, the sales factor at this point effectively utilises an 
origin-based connecting factor. 
                                                 
69 See Art. 11(c)(d). 
70 See Art. 95(2) in conjunction with Art. 96(3). 
71 See, respectively, Hellerstein, above n. 10, at 237-241, and Court of Justice, cases C-60/90 (Polysar), C-155/94 (Wellcome 
Trust Ltd.), C-306/94 (Régie Dauphinoise), C-80/95 (Harnas & Helm), and C-142/99 (Floridienne). 
72 Note that I refer by analogue to the ‘beneficial ownership’ concept in international taxation. 
73 See Hellerstein, above n. 10, at 239. To substantiate the argument, Hellerstein refers by analogue to Microsoft Corp. v. 
Franchise Tax Board, 39 Cal. 4th 750, 139 P.3d 1169, 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d 216 (2006). Analogues to Court of Justice 
jurisprudence on EU VAT, the performing of portfolio asset management and shareholding management functions may 
perhaps be considered part of ordinary trade or business operations  where these functions performed are effected as part of a 
commercial share-dealing activity, in order to secure a direct or indirect involvement in the management of the companies in 
– DRAFT – DO NOT CITE – DO NOT QUOTE – 
 
3.3.3 Potential for Arbitrage: Factor Manipulation 
Would these peculiarities and inconsistencies in the sharing mechanism produce arbitrage 
potentials? Is there a possibility for employing them to arbitrarily shift the tax base to the 
comparatively lower-taxing EU Member State, potentially igniting unforeseen tax 
competition responses? Would the CCCTB produce a potential for a ‘race to the bottom 2.0’ 
under the CCCTB? 
Of course, matters remain to be seen. However, a potential may be recognised for tax 
planning operations and tax competition responses. In my opinion, the arbitrage would 
revolve around: 
1. ‘Labour factor manipulation’ through ‘payroll group members’; 
2. ‘Sales factor manipulation’ through ‘beneficiary group members’; 
3. ‘Sales factor inflation’ through ‘beneficiary group members’ engaging in ‘shareholding-
revenues-carousels’. 
Before proceeding to a description of the potential planning strategies, it may be noted that 
all, essentially, are rooted in the use of the same nexus concepts as utilised in international 
taxation today, that is, the tax place of residence and the permanent establishment. The 
arbitrage that the use of this approach creates is not reversed in the subsequent tax base 
allocation process. 
First, as regards the geographical localisation of a group member within an EU Member 
State’s tax jurisdiction with reference to its tax residence, it may be deduced from well-known 
tax practices that it may not prove too difficult for MNEs to influence this. That is, as this 
matter would revolve substantially around ceremonial events like the chosen company laws 
governing the respective legal entity or the geographic location where the decisions 
                                                                                                                                                        
which the holding has been acquired or where they constitute the direct, permanent and necessary extension of the taxable 
activity. See Polysar, above n. 71, Wellcome Trust Ltd., above n. 71; Régie Dauphinoise, above n. 71; and Floridienne, above 
n. 71. 
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concerning its governance are taken.74 These events may be relatively easily directed towards 
the tax jurisdiction(s) of choice, regardless of the location of real investment. Particularly the 
international convergence of company laws, the cross-border mobility of corporate managers 
– ‘fly-in-fly-out management’ – and the digitisation of the global economy render these tax-
connecting factors rather meaningless and easily steered. As a result, the CCCTB proposal 
seems to provide MNEs a readily available tool to geographically locate group members in a 
‘home country’ at their discretion to influence the tax base allocation under the sharing 
mechanism; that is, if the subsequent sharing process would not resolve things – which to my 
mind is the case. 
Second, as to the geographical localisation of a ‘group member’ within an EU Member State 
tax jurisdiction by reference to the presence of a permanent establishment, it may be deduced 
from known tax practices that this may likely produce rather arbitrary results also. The 
permanent establishment concept requires the establishment of a physical–geographical 
presence within a tax jurisdiction. The mere presence of workers within a country is typically 
insufficient to make a permanent establishment, though.75 Further, note that the emergence of 
the Internet and e-commerce has diminished the need for establishing a tangible presence 
within a country to enter its market.76 A virtual presence through a website may often suffice, 
                                                 
74 Cf. McIntyre, above n. 55, at 270. 
75 That is, perhaps save for the ‘services permanent establishment’ laid down in Art. 5(3)(b) of the United Nations Model 
Double Taxation Convention between Developed and Developing Countries. The operation of this nexus concept establishes 
tax jurisdiction regarding [t]he furnishing of services, including consultancy services, by an enterprise through employees or 
other personnel engaged by the enterprise for such purpose, but only if activities of that nature continue (for the same or a 
connected project) within a Contracting State for a period or periods aggregating more than 183 days in any 12-month 
period commencing or ending in the fiscal year concerned. 
76 See Avi-Yonah, above n. 2, at 1596. 
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particularly where it concerns e-tailers supplying IT services or e-goods.77 As a potential 
consequence, the proceeds from e-commerce activities may be left virtually untaxed in the 
‘host country’. Like the current international tax regime, the CCCTB proposal misses the 
digital economy completely.78 Let us proceed and scrutinise the potential for factor 
manipulation – in increasing relevance. 
3.3.3.1 Ad 1. ‘Labour Factor Manipulation’ Through ‘Payroll Group Members’ 
Payroll, as already noted, would be apportioned to the group member(s) paying the salaries 
and wages and, alternatively, the group member(s) under whose ‘control and responsibility’ 
the employees exercise their employment contracts. As regards the latter, that is, the 
apportioning of the labour factor to the ‘substantive employer group member’ would occur, 
provided that the required reassignment thresholds are met. Please note that the location of 
work performed, as mentioned earlier, seems irrelevant. 
The apportioning of tax base with reference to the group member paying the salaries or, 
alternatively, under whose control and responsibility the employment contracts are exercised 
may invite MNEs to set up and tax-establish ‘payroll group members’ in the comparatively 
lower-taxing jurisdiction to which the workforce is subsequently assigned79, even though the 
firm’s workers may actually exercise their employment contracts across the EU. Perhaps, this 
may hold even in the case of workers who are posted on the basis of intra-group secondment 
contracts. Note that the presence of workers within a country, as discussed, does not in itself 
                                                 
77 An e-tailer is an enterprise that conducts its business online. 
78 See e.g. Lee A. Sheppard, ‘The Digital Economy and Permanent Establishment’, 70 Tax Notes International 297 (Apr. 22, 
2013), Charles McLure, Jr., ‘Alternatives to the Concept of Permanent Establishment’, 1 CESifo Forum 3, at 10-16 (2000); 
Avi-Yonah, above n. 65; and Pinto, above n. 65. 
79 See for a comparison Hellerstein, above n. 10, at 242-243. 
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trigger the presence of a permanent establishment. Although a ‘substantive employer’ concept 
has been put in place, I have some doubts whether the concept is sufficiently robust to 
effectively counter such labour factor manipulation operations. 
The magnitude of the risk of triggering labour factor manipulation involving payroll group 
members may prove to ultimately depend on the interpretation of the terms ‘control and 
responsibility’ in the text of the draft directive. The risk may be greater to the extent that these 
terms would need to be interpreted narrowly cq. legally, for instance with reference to the 
exercising of legal control and responsibility of the group member involved. But the risks 
may significantly arise even under a less restricted interpretation i.e., were the tax base, for 
instance, attributed to the group member to whom the economic risks involving the utilisation 
of the MNE’s workforce have been assigned. In transfer pricing, it is well known that the 
economic risks involving the conducting of economic activity are quite mobile and can be 
legally assigned to group companies by MNE discretion. 
The consequence of using such a labour factor allocation test may be that one-third of the EU-
wide tax base becomes instantly mobile as of the entry into force of the CCCTB. The reality 
of such a planning tool, as already noted, may prove to ultimately depend on the interpretation 
of the terms ‘control and responsibility’. The issue, for instance, may be substantially 
mitigated to the extent that these would need to be interpreted as corresponding with the 
location where the employment contracts are physically performed. However, as this does not 
seem to correspond with the language used in the text of the draft directive, the potential for 
arbitrage may be considered present, at least theoretically. 
Of course, it could be decided to wait and see how the Court of Justice shall interpret the 
language used when it is called upon. Perhaps the court will resolve the matter by extensively 
interpreting the directive text, for example, with reference to its ratio. Or perhaps not. 
Perhaps, therefore, it may be worth assessing the possibility of altering the sharing 
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mechanism, an approach that I would recommend taking. Perhaps it may be considered to 
adopt a ‘factor presence test’ to share the intra-EU tax base. On the basis of such a test, the 
taxable presence of a firm within an EU Member State would be established with reference to 
the presence of a workforce within a tax jurisdiction. Nexus would be based on the physical 
presence of the firm’s workers exercising their employment contracts within a taxing 
jurisdiction. The establishment of the firm’s taxable presence could be subject to a de minimis 
threshold (‘payroll EU Member State A exceeding amount € x’).80 The subsequent allocation 
of the taxable base to that state could be loosely inspired on the distributive rules for 
employment income found in Article 15 OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on 
Capital (‘ ’). That would perhaps 
effectively cancel out artificial tax base-shifting incentives within the EU through labour 
factor manipulation. Namely, under the application of such a factor presence test, the shifting 
of the taxable base would require a physical relocation of MNE workers from one EU 
Member State to another – a shifting of real inputs accordingly.81 
                                                 
80 See footnote 65. Notably, I fail to see why the number of workers would need to be taken into consideration in the 
composition of the labour factor. Wage level differentials are a consequence of labour market imperfections – or at least an 
issue analytically separate from taxation. In my view, these should not be sought to be ‘corrected’ through a tax base 
allocation system. 
81 A similar approach may be feasible regarding the asset factor (nexus: ‘asset values in EU Member State A exceeding 
amount € x’; allocation: ‘assets functionally utilised in EU Member State A’). 
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3.3.3.2 Ad. 2 ‘Sales Factor Manipulation’ Through ‘Beneficiary Group 
Members’ 
Gross receipts from portfolio investments and revenues from hedging instruments, as noted, 
are apportioned to the ‘beneficiary’. This holds to the extent that the group member derives 
these revenues ‘in the ordinary course of trade or business’. 
The apportioning of the tax base under the sales factor to the group member that is entitled to 
the gross proceeds from these intangibles may invite MNEs to set up and tax-establish 
‘beneficiary group members’ in the comparatively lower EU Member State taxing 
jurisdiction. It is also conceivable that MNE groups would set up special vehicles for tax 
planning purposes to which the portfolio investments and hedging positions are being legally 
assigned. The assets involved have quite mobile and intangible characteristics; they have the 
potential of producing a significant turnover, and a moderate extent of labour force is required 
to perform the relevant functions concerned. These things combined may perhaps render the 
sales factor vulnerable and subject to manipulation at this point. Unwanted tax competition 
responses may be the consequence. 
US state income tax law provides some examples by analogue of tax avoidance strategies that 
MNEs may pursue in this area.82 First, reference can be made to a Californian state income tax 
case involving a software enterprise that obtained gross revenues from its sales of short-term 
portfolio investments through the performing of a treasury function.83 It performed the 
function involved at its headquarters in the State of Washington, a state that does not levy a 
state income tax. The portfolio investment revenues accounted for 73% of total gross receipts 
(while producing less than 2% of net income). These revenues accordingly overshadowed the 
                                                 
82 References to US state income tax case law and legislation were drawn from Hellerstein, above n. 10, at 237-241. 
83 See Microsoft, above n. 73. 
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company’s core outputs, the selling of software. As a result, significant amounts of state 
income tax base were at risk of being shifted towards Washington, which would leave it 
untaxed. The California Supreme Court resolved the matter by requiring the software 
company to apply the sales factor to the net portfolio investment income. Referring to the 
language used in the CCCTB proposal – ‘total sales’, ‘proceeds’, ‘revenues’84 – this solution 
may, however, be unavailable under the CCCTB. 
Second, reference can be made to another Californian state income tax case, which deals with 
the application of the sales factor on gross receipts from the sales of commodity futures that 
had been made to hedge against price fluctuations.85 The case involved an enterprise engaged 
in the selling of grain products like flour and cereal. The company engaged in hedging 
transactions to insure itself against fluctuations in the cost prices of the raw grain materials 
that it used in its business process. These enabled it to cancel out grain price fluctuation risks 
to stabilise its profit margins. The company functionally managed its hedging positions at its 
headquarters located in Minnesota. The Californian Court ruled that the gross receipts from 
the selling of commodity futures were included in the sales factor. As the undertaken hedging 
transactions produced substantial turnover (not profit), a significant part of the state income 
tax base was shifted from California to Minnesota. The California state income tax legislature 
responded by excluding amounts received from such hedging transactions from the sales 
factor per 1 January 2011.86 Assuming that this issue may arise under the CCCTB by analogue 
                                                 
84 See Art. 95. 
85 See General Mills v. Franchise Tax Board, 172 Cal. App. 4th 1535, 92 Cal. Rptr. 3d. 208 (1st Dist. 2009). McIntyre, above 
n. 55, addresses an equivalent issue at 286. 
86 Cal. Rev. & Tax Code § 25120(f)(2)(L) (Westlaw 2011). 
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– and I do not see why it would not – the CCCTB appears to be in need of being amended at 
this point also. 
3.3.3.3Ad. 3 ‘Sales Factor Inflation’ Through ‘Shareholding-Revenues-Carousels’ 
Moreover, the sales factor apportions exempt shareholding revenues like dividends and 
capital gains to the beneficiary also. Notably, eligible shareholding proceeds will be exempt 
from the tax base under the CCCTB’s ‘participation exemption regime’.87 It is these I refer to. 
The apportioning of the tax base by reference to the group member functionally performing 
the MNE’s (third-country) shareholding management functions may trigger the risk of 
initiating a process whereby intra-group third-country transactions are set up to inflate the 
sales factor. It is conceivable that MNE groups would set up special vehicles for tax planning 
purposes to which the (third-country) shareholding interests are being legally assigned, that is, 
to subsequently inflate the sales factor via third-country intra-group transactions. Under the 
composition of the sales factor, MNEs seem enabled to do that. They may be able to inflate 
the sales factor by establishing an ongoing process of extracting dividend streams from their 
(third-country) shareholdings financed with capital contributions.88 Such an establishing of 
circular dividend and capital contribution streams does not seem to affect the tax base in an 
upward sense, owing to the application of the participation exemption. Yet, these exempt 
proceeds are recognised as allocable proceeds for tax base sharing purposes under the sales 
factor. The receipts from such sales factor inflating ‘shareholding-revenue-carousels’ have the 
                                                 
87 See Art. 11(c)(d) in conjunction with Arts. 95(2) and 96(3). 
88 The dividend streams may be financed with equity, but perhaps even with intra-group third-country debt. The financing of 
such cash-carrousels with intra-group debt may potentially even negatively affect the EU tax base as the outbound intra-
group interest payments involved may be tax-deductible. Perhaps such interest deductions may end up being restricted under 
the anti-abuse rules. 
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potential of fully eclipsing real outputs. Such tax planning operations may particularly appear, 
I imagine, in cases involving shareholdings in third-country entities in which the CCCTB 
group has a controlling interest, that is, intra-group cash-carousels across the water’s edge. 
Taking into account that the anti-abuse rules in the CCCTB proposal do not seem to cover 
factor manipulation, the sales factor seems very vulnerable at this point. 
The CCCTB proposal accordingly seems to potentially grant MNEs complete discretion as to 
the intra-EU attribution of the sales factor. The consequence may be that an additional one-
third of the EU-wide tax base instantly becomes mobile as of the entry into force of the 
CCCTB Directive. Obviously, the reality of such a planning tool may ultimately depend on 
the interpretation of the terms ‘beneficiary’, ‘the ordinary course of trade or business’, ‘total 
sales’, ‘proceeds’, ‘revenues’ and ‘exempt revenues’. 
The issue may be substantially mitigated to the extent that these would need to be interpreted 
as not to include portfolio investment proceeds, hedging transactions proceeds and revenues 
to which the CCCTB participation exemption applies. Under such an interpretation, the 
respective proceeds would be excluded from the sales factor and could not affect the 
apportioning of the taxable base as a consequence. However, this does not seem to correspond 
with the language used. Arbitrage potentials may therefore be considered present, at least 
theoretically. 
If the aforementioned arbitrage would nevertheless hold, potentially two-thirds of the EU-
wide tax base is at risk of being artificially shifted across the EU upon the CCCTB’s entry 
into force. This may be considered particularly problematical, since it may be infeasible to 
strike down profit shifting through factor manipulation under the CCCTB’s anti-abuse rules. 
The CCCTB would accordingly provide MNEs readily available tools to engage in artificial 
tax base shifting. 
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This matter may arise in addition to the vulnerability of the EU tax base of being subject to 
traditional base erosion and profit-shifting operations across the water’s edge. The CCCTB, as 
already noted, would basically operate as a conventional corporate tax across the water’s 
edge, consequently triggering conventional tax planning opportunities. In view of this, it 
seems that future tax planning within the EU would occur in two steps. First, the EU-wide tax 
base would be eroded via traditional tax planning across the water’s edge. Second, the eroded 
EU-wide tax base would be artificially shifted for up to two-thirds to the comparatively 
lowest EU Member State taxing jurisdiction. 
If the CCCTB proposal were enacted as currently proposed, the CCCTB accordingly seems to 
bear the potential to reinvigorate aggressive tax planning operations and fierce tax 
competition responses of EU Member States attempting to attract the (eroded) tax base. Since 
the EU Member States would only have the tax rate at their disposal to affect MNE location 
decisions, perhaps the CCCTB may initiate an unforeseen ‘race to the bottom 2.0’. 
To be honest, I do not really see why these issues would not arise. Of course, it could be 
decided to wait and see how the Court of Justice will interpret the language used. Perhaps the 
court will help the EU Member States also at this place by resolving the matter through 
extensive interpretations of the directive text. Perhaps, alternatively, it may be worth assessing 
the option of structurally altering the composition of the sales factor in the sharing 
mechanism. I would favour taking that alternative approach, and advocate the following 
changes to the sales factor: 
 First, it may be worth considering introducing the rule that only gross receipts that 
contribute to the production of taxable income are to be included in the sales factor.89 That 
                                                 
89 See for a comparison, Hellerstein, above n. 10, at 238: “[T]he US subnational state sales factors … defined ‘gross receipts’ 
… that they had to generate apportionable income.” 
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would effectively cancel out sales factor inflation opportunities through the 
aforementioned cash-carousels involving exempt revenues. The exempt proceeds would 
not affect the sales factor under the suggested approach. 90 
 Second, drawing inspiration from the work undertaken in the US by the Multistate Tax 
Commission on revising the Multistate Tax Compact,91 it may be worth scrutinising the 
option of excluding from the sales factor receipts from the performing of treasury 
functions, cash-pooling functions, portfolio investment activities and hedging 
transactions.92 In the US, the Uniformity Committee, for instance, has suggested the 
following provision: ‘Receipts’ means gross receipts of the taxpayer (…) that are received 
from transactions and activity in the regular course of the taxpayer’s trade or business; 
except that receipts of a taxpayer other than a securities dealer from hedging transactions 
and from the maturity, redemption, sale, exchange, loan or other disposition of cash or 
securities, shall be excluded.93 The adoption of an equivalent approach in the CCCTB 
would perhaps halt the arbitrage potentials referred to in the above. 
 Third, it might be considered to adopt a ‘factor presence test’ under the sales factor as 
well. On the basis of a sales factor presence test, nexus within a tax jurisdiction would be 
established with reference to the presence of gross receipts within that tax jurisdiction. 
The establishing of the firm’s taxable presence could be subject to a de minimis threshold 
(‘gross receipts from customers located in EU Member State A exceeding amount € x’).94 
                                                 
90 Cf. WP 060, above n. 59, at 13; and Mayer, above n. 19, at 217. 
91 The Multistate Tax Commission is an intergovernmental advisory state tax agency. The Multistate Tax Compact, among others, 
provides for a model state income tax statute from which the US states may draw inspiration in designing their state income tax systems. 
92 That is, unless the taxpayer is a securities dealer. See MTC 2012a, above n. 63, at 14-18; and MTC 2012b, above n. 63. 
93 See MTC 2012a, above n. 63, at 15. For discussion and critique see Sutherland Asbill & Brennan LLP, Comments on the 
MTC’s Proposed Amendments to Article IV Of the Multistate Tax Compact, Presented to the MTC Public Hearing, 
Washington, DC, March 28, 2013, Statement of Benjamin F. Miller for the Hearing on Proposed Amendments to Article IV of 
the Multistate Tax Compact, Washington D.C., March 28 and 29, 2013, and Additional Comment by Benjamin F. Miller with 
Respect to Testimony Offered at the Hearing of March 28, 2013 in Washington D.C. Proposed Amendment to Section 17 of 
Article IV. 
94 See n. 65. 
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The inspiration for the designing of such a tax-connecting factor could be found in the 
distance sales rules in EU-VAT.95 The subsequent allocation of the taxable base to that 
state could be inspired on EU-VAT as well, particularly the place of supply rules.96 Viz., 
these aim at locating the customer in the destination jurisdiction. The assigning of the tax 
base via that means would perhaps effectively mitigate artificial tax base-shifting 
incentives within the EU through sales factor manipulation. Under the application of such 
a factor presence test, the shifting of the taxable base would require a physical relocation 
of the MNE’s marketplace from one EU Member State to another – a shifting of real firm 
outputs accordingly.97 
4 Concluding Remarks 
Would the CCCTB – if enacted as currently proposed – provide incentives for MNEs to 
pursue artificial tax base shifting within the EU? Could these potentially invigorate the risk of 
undue governmental tax competition responses? 
Obviously, things remain to be seen, but for now my tentative answer is in the affirmative. 
Currently, the issue of harmful tax competition within the EU seems to have been pushed 
back as a result of the soft law approaches that were initiated in the late 1990s and early 
2000s. However, if the CCCTB in its current draft is enacted, there may be a risk that two-
thirds of the EU-wide tax base would become mobile, at least theoretically. Upon its entry 
into force, the CCCTB would perhaps pave the way for ‘factor-manipulation’ operations, for 
instance through ‘payroll group members’ and ‘beneficiary group members’. Particularly the 
potential for sales factor inflation through the aforementioned ‘cash-carousels’ may produce 
undesirable effects. 
                                                 
95 See Arts. 33 and 34 Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax. 
96 See Title V – ‘place of taxable transactions’, Council Directive 2006/112/EC. 
97 As said, a similar approach may be feasible for consistency reasons regarding the asset factor (nexus: ‘asset values in EU 
Member State A exceeding amount € x’; allocation: ‘assets functionally utilised in EU Member State A’). 
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Time will tell. Perhaps the issue will not arise in the first place as a result of extensive judicial 
interpretations of the language used in the directive text by the Court of Justice. Perhaps 
matters will alternatively be resolved. Maybe the anti-abuse approaches will prove applicable 
after all. Perhaps the safeguard clause will operate effectively, or maybe the Commission will 
prove to have sufficient legislative powers to adopt delegated acts to effectively counter factor 
manipulation. Perhaps not. That may be considered problematical indeed, particularly since 
the EU Member States in that case would merely dispose of a single instrument to respond to 
MNE tax planning operations – tax rate reduction. To cancel out any potential for initiating a 
‘race to the bottom 2.0.’ upfront, it might be worth assessing some alternatives to the sharing 
mechanism as currently drafted. I would, for instance, favour using quantitative ‘factor 
presence tests’ to attribute the tax base to EU Member States directly.  
